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Abstract
Since 2009, European central bankers have supported some reforms, in order to draw
roadmaps to get out of the euro debt crisis. This paper tests whether the educational and
professional background of European central bankers matter for the type of reforms each of
them advocated. Through a textual analysis of public speeches delivered by the European
central bankers, we draw a cognitive map for each of them and, thus, of the reforms they
propose as ways out of the euro debt crisis. Our results show that their occupational
background is an important determinant of their respective economic reform proposals.
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I Introduction
That financial crises are necessarily followed by structural and economic reforms is now well
established, as Tommasi and Velasco (1996, p. 197) state: “That economic crises seem either
to facilitate or outright cause economic reforms is part of the new conventional wisdom on re-
form”. Rodrik (1996, p. 27) adds further that:“...if an economy in crisis has not yet reformed,
the frequently proffered explanation is that the crisis has not yet become severe enough”. This
comes in accordance with the results of Tornell (1998), who finds that between 1970 and 1995,
almost 80% of the trade reforms occurred during periods of either economic crises or drastic
political changes. Drazen and Easterly (2001) find also evidence for the “crisis-induces-reform”
hypothesis, but only for some variables like the inflation rate or the black market premium, and
not for the current account deficit and the budget deficit. According to the authors, the ease of
correcting different types of crises may explain these results. Alesina et al. (2006) argue that
the term “reform” in such a context means a major change in policy, and they distinguish two
types of reforms: stabilization reforms like major fiscal adjustment, and structural reforms like
liberalization of good markets, changes in the regulatory environment, or labor market reforms.
As a case in point, the emergence of the euro sovereign debt crisis at the beginning of 2010,
and the exacerbation of the incompleteness of EMU’s institutional framework and its vulner-
abilities, required new measures and immediate reforms from the ECB as well as other policy
makers (Aizenman, 2013). There is now wide recognition of the need to secure sustainable pub-
lic finances, and to reinforce supervision, regulation and resolution procedures across euro area
countries. Then, the euro debt crisis constitutes a sort of experiment for the “crisis-induces-
reform” hypothesis.
As European central bankers have had to cope with the crisis, they have suggested to implement
reforms to solve it. They have notably used their speeches to convey their opinions about the
economic reforms to implement (de Jong and Van Esch, 2013), likewise they send signals about
their monetary policy preferences (de Haan and Jansen, 2006).
The empirical literature has shown that monetary policy preferences of central bankers are af-
fected by their occupational and educational background, e.g., Harris et al. (2011) and Eichler
and La¨hner (2013) find that having experience in the central bank, the industry sector, and in
academia is a source of variation in policy preferences inside the monetary policy committee of
the Bank of England and the Federal Market Open Committee. Here, we investigate whether
these background characteristics have an influence on European central bankers’ economic re-
form proposals. More precisely, we check whether education and former occupation affect their
respective policy preferences with respect to the crisis.
The relationship between a person’s education and his or her economic preferences has been stud-
ied by Frank et al. (1993, 1996), Frey et al. (1993), Frey and Meier (2003), Rubinstein (2006)
and Goossens and Me´on (2010). These authors have shown that education strongly influences
behavior in economic decision-making.
However, one major point of discussion in this literature is whether such differences in economic
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attitudes stem from indoctrination or from self-selection, i.e., they could be the result of studying
different topics or from a selection process whereby students choose a field that is closer to their
prior beliefs. Some studies find evidence of the selection hypothesis, such as Carter and Irons
(1991), Yezer et al. (1996), Frank and Schulze (2000), Gandal and Roccas (2002), Frey and
Meier (2003). According to the self-selection hypothesis, economics students deliberately choose
to study economics because they are already different or have different views than other students.
This view implies that the study period of several years has no marginal effect on the students’
value system. This theory is in line with the crystallization thesis of Hess and Torney (1967),
which suggests that values are determined in the first 13 years of life and that these values remain
stable thereafter. However, most sociologists tend to reject this view of value formation as being
static. Instead, it is argued that one’s socialization is an ongoing process (Hurrelmann, 2002).
This would be consistent with Becker’s (1996) model of man’s values and attitudes, according
to which values and attitudes result from an ongoing investment in human and social capital1.
This hypothesis is in line with studies that report evidence of indoctrination effect, such as Frank
et al. (1993), Haucap and Just (2004), Gross (2005), Cipriani et al. (2009), Bauman and Rose
(2011), and Giuliano and Spilimbergo (2014).
In addition to education, other influences might shape a person’s economic preferences, such as
the profession the person exerts after receiving his/her education. As an illustration, Frey (1986)
shows that economists working in the government had less trust in the market than academic
economists; while, for instance, 45% of academic economists believed that minimum wages in-
crease unemployment, only 33% of economists working in the government held the same belief.
Coleman (1992) finds that economists have different opinions about the justice of redistributive
transfers, the merits of privatization and the need to manage demand to avoid unemployment,
and that these differences are correlated with the place of employment, gender and age. For
instance, male economists under 40 years of age working in the government and business sectors
appear to be the strongest supporters of the market mechanism.
Against this background, we can only expect that the educational and the professional indoctri-
nation influence European central bankers’ economic reform proposals: central bankers with an
experience in the private sector might favor measures that aim to stabilize the banking sector,
while central bankers from the public sector might promote the implementation of reforms that
help sustain public finances.
Hence, we focus on the education and career background of central bank governors in the Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union (EMU), and how these attributes impact on the reform proposals
they made during their tenure, since the start of the euro debt crisis. To the best of our knowl-
edge, this paper is the first which studies the relationship between EMU central bankers’ reform
proposals since the onset of the euro debt crisis and their personal characteristics. For that
purpose, we rely on central bankers’ public speeches to extract their reform proposals, using the
technique of cognitive mapping introduced in section 2. In section 3, we outline the model and,
1According to this model, university education has a strong impact on one’s values, and differences in education
should lead to different value sets.
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in section 4, we assess the extent of the influence of central bankers’ personal characteristics on
their economic reform proposals. Section 5 provides further extensions while the last section
concludes.
II Mapping the brains of central bankers
To determine the reform proposals made by the European central bankers to stimulate the econ-
omy in the context of the euro debt crisis, we proceed to a textual analysis of their public speeches
using a hand-coding process. However, central bankers make speeches in various contexts and
may talk about reforms which are not related to the euro debt crisis, but to different circum-
stances. As an illustration, Luc Coene, the Belgian central banker since 2011, is member of the
advisory board of the think tank “Itinera Institute”2. He may then make propositions that fall
within its scope of actions in his speeches (such as poverty and inequality, education, ageing
and pensions, energy and environment). Therefore, it is necessary to contextualize the reform
proposals central bankers make in their speeches. Such contextualization requires the technique
of cognitive mapping.
Cognitive mapping is a method commonly used in the fields of political science, social psychology
and organizational studies. It enables a systematic analysis of leaders’ policy beliefs embedded
in public assertions, and allows to make qualitative and/or quantitative comparisons of these
beliefs3. It offers ways to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze both the content and struc-
ture of belief-systems. While most of the studies using the cognitive mapping focused on foreign
policy beliefs (with an emphasis on U.S. presidents), as we will show, this technique also applies
to different topics, delivering interesting insights.
Wrightson (1976, pp. 291-332) described the process of coding cognitive maps from texts as
a “sophisticated” content analysis. This technique involves creating cognitive maps through a
hand-coding textual analysis of public speeches. The coder looks for “cause concept -linkage-
effect concept” relationships. This involves identifying concepts and the relationships between
those concepts. The term “concept” refers in this context to the mental representation a central
banker has when talking about macroeconomic variables (inflation, deficit...), economic instru-
ments (tax, capital requirements...), or economic reforms (banking union, supervisory mech-
anism...). A cognitive map thus gives a structured overview of a policy-maker’s position on
certain issues related to the euro debt crisis, and shows how its outlined concepts are linked, and
indicates which ones are positively or negatively related. Policy-makers’ preferences and causal
reasoning may be determined from the maps. In contrast to basic content analysis, which is es-
sentially a counting procedure, the analysis in a cognitive map is based on the causal relationship
between concepts, not on the concepts themselves. Then, cognitive maps allow to distinguish the
reforms European central bankers made in the context of the euro debt crisis from the reforms
2See:www.itinerainstitute.org/en/about-itinera/advisory-board. [Accessed on January 2015].
3See Axelrod (1976), Bougon et al. (1977) for seminal papers and Schafer and Young (1998), Eden and
Ackermann (1998), Curseu et al. (2010), and Van Esch (2012) for more recent uses.
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made during other events/crises4. Hence, it is the most adequate textual analysis method to
extract and conceptualize the reforms central bankers propose to counteract the effects induced
by the euro debt crisis.
Given that private documents are inaccessible to the general public, the empirical studies in
politics and psychology have mainly used public sources to assess policy makers’ views (Van
Esch, 2007). One might argue that asserting policy makers’ beliefs from public sources may be
biased given that they are written by speech writers, and thus do not reflect their personal views
about the necessary reforms. However, Renshon (2009) shows that analyzing public sources
leads to the same outcomes as private sources, providing confirmation of the validity of using
public speeches to assess leaders’ beliefs. Moreover, de Jong and Van Esch (2013) argue that
an additional advantage of using public speeches is that they reflect the person’s opinion in its
official role, which may be the exact reason why she can be influential. For the present study,
public speeches by central bank officials are written by a department in the national central
banks, and can be subject to review by the Board. Thus, there might be a degree of censorship
or restraint and we cannot control for that. However, in our view, this makes our results even
stronger since central bankers’ speeches might reveal more subtler perspectives on their personal
views on reforms despite the potential censorship. Moreover, if the empirical analysis reveals the
importance of some traits, it can only be biased towards the null hypothesis of no-influence.
To determine European central bankers’ views on the euro debt crisis and their respective reform
proposals, a cognitive map is created for each of them based on all their public speeches5 from
October 20096 until July 2013 (see Appendix A), in front of national and international audiences.
We ignore Executive Board members given that the preliminary analysis of their speeches has
shown that they are primarily ECB’s policy representatives.
Cognitive maps are created as follows: the causal relations between concepts revealed through
the textual analysis are transformed into graphic maps in which the concepts are depicted as
points and the relations between these concepts as arrows. A concept at the tail of an arrow is
taken to cause, or influence, the concept at the arrowhead. When an arrowhead is shown with
a positive sign (+) attached, then the first pole of the tail concept implies the second pole of
the head concept. We thus distinguish in the maps the reforms they advocate (cause concepts),
and their positive/negative impact (linkage) on some economic aggregates (effect concepts), such
as economic growth, the level of unemployment or the government budget balance. Given the
research question raised by this present study, it is the cause concepts that serve as an indicator,
first to reveal the differences between European central bankers’ reform proposals, and second, to
assess the influence of their educational and professional background on their respective propo-
4Like, e.g., the subprime mortgage crisis.
5Public speeches of central bankers are available in the Bank of International Settlements database
(www.bis.org/list/cbspeeches/from 01011999/index.htm).
6In October 2009, the new Greek government revealed that previous Greek governments had been underre-
porting the budget deficit. From this period onward, similar concerns arose in Ireland, Portugal, Spain and Italy,
amplifying notably the risk of contagion of rising spreads on sovereign bonds. This rapidly led to tensions in the
euro sovereign debt market.
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sitions.
As an example of this technique, Figure 1 represents an excerpt of the cognitive map of Erkki
Liikanen (2004 -...), the governor of the Bank of Finland, when he talks about the euro debt
crisis.
Figure 1: Excerpt of Liikanen’s cognitive map
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Confidence 
Stability of the 
financial system 
Macroprudential 
instruments 
EU/IMF 
adjustment 
program 
Growth 
sustainability 
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+ 
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+ 
+ 
+ + 
+ 
+ 
+ 
Figure 1 above shows the cause concepts (reforms) in circles and the effect concepts in
rectangles. The arrow reveals the direction of causality between the concepts, while the sign
(+) exposes their (positive) impact.
As shown in the map, governor Liikanen considers that the macroprudential instruments (cause
concept/reform) have a positive impact (linkage) on the stability of the financial system (effect
concept). For more details on the construction of a cognitive map from a speech, see Appendix
B.
We use the frequency of the cause concepts7 derived from the cognitive map of each central
banker as dependent variable, to reveal the impact of their educational and professional
background on their reform proposals. The resulting cognitive maps contain up to 30 economic
reforms proposed by the European central bankers in the context of the euro debt crisis, that
we regroup in different categories (see Table 5 in appendix C):
-Reforms of the banking and finance industry
-Basel 3 implementation
7The frequency with which they are mentioned in central bankers’ speeches.
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-Consolidation measures
-Federally oriented reforms
-Liberalization market reforms
-Unconventional monetary easing
III Data and Methodology
To assess the influence of the biographical features on the reform proposals derived from the
cognitive maps of each European central banker, we estimate a Tobit regression model, which is
the most adequate given the nature of our data.
The Tobit model describes the relationship between a non-negative dependent variable yi and an
independent variable xi, which can be described in terms of a latent variable y
∗
i . If we consider
that y∗i is observed if y
∗
i>0 and is not observed if y
∗
i =0, then, the observed yi is defined as :
yi =
y∗i = βxi + ui if y∗i > 00 if y∗i = 0
The Tobit model is convenient for the censored regression model, because some observations on
y∗i (those for which y
∗
i =0) are censored. In other words, the latent variable yi is only observed
if y∗i>0. The actual dependent variable is : yi=max(0,y
∗
i ). As Wooldridge (2002) suggests
8, a
censored regression model applies when there is a variable with quantitative meaning, y∗, which
is censored from below or above , i.e., it is not observed for some part of the population.
In our case, we face a censored regression model given that 12 out of 17 central bankers (70%)
left or took their position during the period of analysis (2009-2013) (see Table 4 in appendix
A). Therefore, some dependent variables may not be observable for some central bankers. For
instance, some reforms have been applied before the appointment of some central bankers9,
thus, these reforms are absent in their respective proposals, and not because they did explicitly
choose not to mention them. We estimate then a linear relationship between variables with a left
censoring in the dependent variable10. We check whether any of the assumptions of the censored
normal regression model is violated, in particular if there is heteroscedasticity or non-normality,
and find that the results are consistent11.
Our sample covers the period running from October 2009 until July 2013, and includes all EMU
central bankers who have made public speeches12. The estimated equation takes the following
8“the censored regression model arises due to data censoring. In particular, the underlying dependent variable
is roughly continuous but it is censored below or above a certain value due to the way we collect the data or to
institutional constraints. In a sense, the problem solved by censored regression is a missing data problem, but we
have useful information on the nature of the missing data” (p. 551).
9The Basel 3 accord was agreed in December 2010. Therefore, it is obvious that a central banker such as
Ignazio Visco, who was appointed on November 2011 as a governor of the Bank of Italy, will not talk about it as
a crucial reform to adopt.
10Censoring from the left takes place when cases with a value that fall at a threshold (0) are censored.
11Test results available upon request.
12Except for Vitor Constancio, given that he was appointed vice-president of the ECB on May 2010.
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form:
reformx,i = α+ β1profi + β2educi + β3appoint politi + γXi (1)
where reformx,i is the ratio of reform x proposed by central banker i to the total number of all
reforms stated in his speeches13 (and derived from his cognitive map) during the covered period,
i.e., it reflects the relative importance he grants to the reform x in his speeches14. The form of
the dependent variable (ratio) impedes the use of a Count data model, given that it does not
comply with one of the fundamental conditions of the Poisson distribution, i.e., the use of an
integer as a dependent variable.
profi is the profession of central banker i, educi represents his education and appoint politi the
political affiliation of the government that appointed central banker i. We consider eight different
background indicators, of which four are dummy variables for working experience, two dummies
for education background and two additional dummies for political affiliation. Finally, given
that in the euro area central bankers are appointed by countries with different and sometimes
antagonist interests, we introduce a set of control variables Xi to control for this potential het-
erogeneity. Xi includes the growth of GDP, the growth of the unemployment rate, the growth
of the debt level, and the inflation rate of the country of central banker i during his tenure for
the covered period.
With regard to education, we distinguish holders of a Ph.D and holders of a MSc. As for occu-
pational background, (private) bankers, economic scholars, central bank staff and civil servants
are distinguished. We follow Go¨hlmann and Vaubel (2007) and consider that if a central banker
has worked in more than one profession, we take into account his entire background. For in-
stance, if a central bank governor has experience in the academic and the banking sectors, both
background indicator variables take the value 115. Finally, given that the governor of the central
bank is usually appointed by the government or by parliament, that a political party tends to
nominate committee members with similar preferences (Havrilesky and Gildea, 1992; Chappell
et al., 1993; Vaubel, 1997; Berger and Woitek, 1997; Ennser-Jedenastik, 2014), and that partisan
ideologies appear to play an important role in the monetary policy committee’s voting calculus
(McGregor, 1996; Neuenkirch and Neumeier, 2013), we consider that the political affiliation of
the government that has appointed central banker i may have an impact on its reform proposals.
We thus distinguish the central bankers appointed by right wing governments from the central
bankers appointed by left wing governments. We use the variance inflation factor to check for
multicollinearity, and find that the null hypothesis of no collinearity cannot be rejected.
It is worth noting that introducing a time dimension in this estimation is pointless given that
central bankers deliver speeches when they are invited for conferences or seminars. Then, the
distribution of speeches, and thus, of their reform proposals, is random throughout the period of
13We consider a ratio given that central bankers talk with different frequencies, as shown in Table 4 of Appendix
A.
14Due to space constraints, statistics about the left-hand side variables are available upon request.
15This is particularly relevant for the European central bankers, given that a non negligible share of them have
cumulated a position in the university and in the public, the private or the central banking sectors.
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analysis.
Figure 2 below summarizes the educational and occupational background of the European central
bankers.
Figure 2: The educational and occupational background of the European central bankers (2009-
2013)
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Figure 2 shows that most of the central bankers in the EMU have a background in the public
sector, followed by those with a previous experience in the academic and in the central banking
sectors. Those having an experience in the private sector, e.g. the banking sector, represents
a small share in the Governing Council. Concerning the educational background of central
bank governors, holders of a Ph.D represent a majority in the committee (65%). Finally, given
the political diversity of parties leading the EMU countries during that period, the number of
central bankers appointed by left wing governments is approximately the same than the number
of central bankers appointed by right wing governments in the Governing Council.
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IV Results
Table 1 below details the results of the regressions. Given that we consider all the positions
European central bankers had in their professional background, i.e., a single central banker may
have multiple professional positions (as in Go¨hlmann and Vaubel, 2007), there is no perfect
multicollinearity and no risk of being in a dummy variable trap. These dummy variables are
thus not mutually exclusive. So doing, we do not need to consider a reference group for the
professional positions. Concerning the variables profi and educi, they are mutually exclusive: a
central banker has either a PhD or a Msc., and is either appointed by a left-wing government or
a right-wing government. Therefore, the central banker i who holds a MSc, and who has been
appointed by a right wing party is used as a reference in the estimations.
10
Table 1: Economic reforms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant
-0.14 0.08 -0.1*** -0.04 -0.34*** -0.25
(0.1) (0.1) (0.007) (0.47) (0.003) (0.1)
Occupational Background
Banker
-0.04 0.1** 0.03 -0.01 -0.07 -0.62**
(0.52) (0.04) (0.18) (0.77) (0.24) (0.01)
Civil servant
-0.04 0.07*** 0.04** -0.05* 0.06 -0.02
(0.38) (0.006) (0.02) (0.06) (0.12) (0.69)
Central Bank
0.02 -0.04* 0.009 0.02 0.05 0.03
(0.52) (0.09) (0.55) (0.51) (0.12) (0.68)
Academic
-0.04 -0.13*** -0.02 -0.02 0.07 -0.04
(0.37) (0.001) (0.15) (0.60) (0.19) (0.53)
Education
Ph.D
0.04 0.004 0.03** 0.02 0.04 0.14**
(0.31) (0.87) (0.04) (0.37) (0.3) (0.01)
MSc Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Political Appointment
Left wing
0.06* -0.01 0.03*** -0.02 0.06* -0.1
(0.08) (0.54) (0.003) (0.46) (0.05) (0.17)
Right wing Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Control variables
GDP growth
0.003 0.0005 0.003*** -0.002 0.006* -0.008
(0.35) (0.82) (0.003) (0.48) (0.05) (0.15)
Unemployment
0.001 -0.006 0.006** -0.008 0.01* -0.006
(0.88) (0.98) (0.01) (0.17) (0.07) (0.63)
Debt
0.001* 0.002 0.0002 0.001** 0.006 0.002*
(0.09) (0.97) (0.4) (0.02) (0.5) (0.07)
Inflation
0.005 -0.01** -0.005* 0.008 0.009 0.03**
(0.94) (0.03) (0.05) (0.23) (0.29) (0.03)
Number of observations 136 102 102 85 68 34
(1): Banking and Finance industry reforms. (2): Basel 3 implementation. (3): Consolidation measures. (4): Federally oriented reforms. (5): Market Liberalizing reforms.
(6): Unconventional monetary easing.
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%, p-value in parentheses.
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It has to be remembered that each reform category16 regroups a set of economic reforms that
are detailed in the results’ comments below (see Table 5 of Appendix C).
A first interesting observation concerns the central bankers with an experience in the public sec-
tor: on average, they are more likely to call for the implementation of economic reforms in their
speeches than their colleagues from the banking, the central banking, and the academic sectors.
In particular, they advocate the need for adopting consolidation measures, which consist on cor-
recting the public finance imbalances, by reducing governments’ expenditures and restructuring
the public debt. They highlight notably the fact that governments (especially from Southern
Europe) need to recover stability in public finances to ensure a sustainable economic growth, and
to make more effective the impact of the ECB’s non-standard monetary measures. Moreover,
and such as their colleagues from the banking sector, they encourage the implementation of the
norms contained in Basel 3 (column 2), which is not the case for central bankers from the aca-
demic and the central banking sectors. They thus call for the introduction of the countercyclical
capital buffer and the increase of capital requirements. These reforms are supposed to strengthen
bank capital requirements by increasing bank liquidity and decreasing bank leverage. Therefore,
central bankers from the public sector emphasize the need for stricter policy rules to put a ceil-
ing on governments’ expenses and on banks’ investments. Nevertheless, and as shown in column
(4), these central bankers do not highlight the need for federally oriented reforms through their
speeches. Hence, they do not insist on the need of a better coordination policy in the eurozone,
like a political or a banking union, as well as a common supervision at the European level.
As regards the unconventional monetary easing instruments, central bankers from the banking
sector seem to be reluctant to explicitly advocate in their speeches the adoption of non standard
measures to help sustain the public finances of some EMU member countries, like the intro-
duction of the Long term refinancing operations (LTRO), or the purchase of government bonds
(column 6). The aim of these non-standard measures is to support the effective transmission of
monetary policy to the economy, by enhancing the provision of credit to the private sector, and
keeping contagion in financial markets contained.
Concerning the impact of the political affiliation of the governments that appointed central
bankers, we notice that the ones who have been appointed by a left-wing government focus in
their speeches on the necessity of liberalizing the markets on the one hand (column 5), by asking
for labor market reforms, privatization measures, and the removal of competition barriers. These
central bankers highlight the need for some countries (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) to increase
competitiveness and to lower production costs, in order to build foundation for GDP growth and
to decrease the unemployment rate.
On the other hand, estimation result in column (1) reveals that these central bankers also tend
to insist on the reforms of the banking and finance industry that member countries should im-
plement to reclaim their financial sector, and to establish a safe and growth enhancing financial
sector in Europe. Thus, these central bankers assert the importance of improving the regula-
16i.e., reforms of the banking and finance industry, Basel 3 implementation, Consolidation measures, Federally
oriented reforms, Liberalization market reforms, and Unconventional monetary easing.
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tory framework in their speeches, by separating and restructuring banks’ activities, establishing
a resolution regime, increasing the macroprudential instruments and the level of transparency
of financial firms. The aim of these reforms is to strengthen regulation and supervision of the
financial sector, to provide an effective response to the financial crisis, and to ensure that it can
put the euro area back on the path of a sustainable and inclusive growth. The significant coeffi-
cient in column (3) shows that they also follow this line of thought by calling for consolidation
measures.
Finally, the results reveal that central bankers with a PhD are more likely to talk about specific
reforms to stimulate the economic recovery than those with a MSc., as they call for the adoption
of consolidation measures (like, e.g., the enforcement of the Stability and the Growth Pact or the
adoption of a budget adjustment program - see column 3), and unconventional monetary easing
instruments (column 6). This confirms the argument proposed by Rajan (2004): policy-makers
with a better qualification are more prone to propose specific and detailed economic measures
than their colleagues, as they may feel more confident about their potential benefits.
In the context of the euro debt crisis, the findings reveal that central bankers with a background
in the public sector tend to promote reforms to enhance countries’ capacities to withstand the
economic slowdown, and to render their economic growth’s framework more sustainable. Hence,
they also have a national perspective when they consider the reforms that should be adopted as
a way out of the euro debt crisis.
These first results empirically confirm the relevance of the theoretical literature about the pro-
fessional and the educational indoctrination process, i.e., it appears that this indoctrination is
a source of variation in the attitude of economic policy-makers such as the European central
bankers, vis-a`-vis the euro debt crisis. The results show that in the context of the EMU, some
central bankers have particular preferences when considering the structural and the stabilization
reforms that should be implemented to face the euro debt crisis, and that these preferences are
related (at least in part) to their biographical background.
V Extensions and robustness tests
As Figure 3 below shows, central bankers had diverse professional experiences with different
magnitudes. Thus, a natural question is to check whether this diversity and the different years
in office have an impact on the results, given that the indoctrination process has a crucial role in
shaping poliy-makers’ beliefs. We propose two extensions in what follows: (i) a finer professional
distinction among central bankers, (ii) a consideration of the years in office European central
bankers spent in their past professional positions (see Table 6 of Appendix D).
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Figure 3: The occupational background of the European central bankers.
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V.1 A finer professional distinction
In the Governing Council of the ECB, there are several central bankers with a position both in
the academic sector and in another sector. Hence, we propose additional dummy variables with
interaction terms related to this professional background. The aim is to show the specific impact
of having an experience in the academic sector on European central bankers’ reform proposals.
The regression has the same components as equation (1), except that the independent variable
profi comprises now the following professional categories:
-civil servant,
-central banker,
-academic*civil servant,
-academic*banker,
-academic*central banker.
We omit the variable “banker” due to perfect multicollinearity with the variable “aca-
demic*banker”17. Table 2 below details the results of the estimations.
17As shown in Table 6 in Appendix D, all the central bankers who had an experience as “banker” also had an
experience as “academic”.
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Table 2: Economic reforms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant
-0.15* 0.01 -0.13*** -0.06 -0.33*** -0.26*
(0.06) (0.74) (0.0004) (0.33) (0.005) (0.07)
Occupational Background
civil servant
0.01 0.1*** 0.02 -0.1** -0.01 -0.02
(0.77) (0.002) (0.36) (0.02) (0.8) (0.8)
central banker
-0.002 -0.1 0.05* 0.07* 0.1 0.04
(0.9) (0.7) (0.09) (0.09) (0.2) (0.64)
Acad.*civil
-0.09 -0.08 0.02 0.07 0.12 -0.02
(0.31) (0.13) (0.5) (0.19) (0.27) (0.7)
Acad.*banker
-0.02 0.06 0.01 -0.05 -0.08 -0.65**
(0.66) (0.16) (0.7) (0.2) (0.25) (0.01)
Acad.*central banker
0.02 -0.06 -0.05* -0.06 -0.07 -0.007
(0.8) (0.15) (0.09) (0.16) (0.53) (0.9)
Education
Ph.D
0.05 -0.007 0.02 -0.005 0.04 0.13*
(0.25) (0.8) (0.18) (0.9) (0.3) (0.05)
MSc Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Political Appointment
Left wing
0.06* -0.02 0.03*** -0.02 0.06* -0.1
(0.09) (0.2) (0.008) (0.4) (0.06) (0.19)
Right wing Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Control variables
GDP growth
0.002 0.002 0.004*** -0.001 0.006** -0.007
(0.48) (0.9) (0.002) (0.7) (0.04) (0.18)
Unemployment
0.001 0.002 0.007*** -0.006 0.01* -0.005
(0.84) (0.6) (0.006) (0.2) (0.09) (0.71)
Debt
0.001 0.0003 0.005 0.001** 0.001 0.002
(0.12) (0.6) (0.1) (0.02) (0.3) (0.14)
Inflation
-0.003 -0.01 -0.002 0.01* 0.01 0.03**
(0.7) (0.13) (0.48) (0.06) (0.25) (0.02)
Number of observations 136 102 102 85 68 34
(1): Banking and Finance industry reforms. (2): Basel 3 implementation. (3): Consolidation measures. (4): Federally oriented reforms. (5): Market Liberalizing reforms. (6): Unconventional
monetary easing.
significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%, p-value in parentheses.
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Even if we introduce interaction terms to reveal the impact of an additional experience in
the academic sector on central bankers’ reform proposals, the results depicted in Table 2 are still
broadly in line with those without interaction terms (cf. section 4).
First, and according to column (3), central bankers from the central banking sector call for
the implementation of consolidation measures, while it is the opposite for those coming from
both the central banking and the academic sectors (i.e., “acad*central banker” is negative and
significant). Given that the total impact of having an experience in the central banking sector
is rather depicted in Table 1 and is non significant, we cannot pretend that all central bankers
coming from the central banking sector call for consolidation measures, it seems that only those
without an experience in the academic sector do so (for an explanation of the interpretation of
the interaction terms - see Brambor et al., 2006). The significant coefficients with opposite signs
in column (3) confirm the relevance of this argument. Second, and as shown in column (2), we
obtain quite similar findings for the reforms referring to Basel 3 implementation, that is, central
bankers from the public sector and with no experience in the academic sector call for the increase
of capital requirements through their speeches18.
Third, central bankers appointed by left-wing governments advocate the need to implement
reforms for the banking and finance industry (column 1), market liberalizing measures, and
consolidation reforms (columns 3 and 5). Fourth, regarding the “Federally oriented reforms”
(column 4), central bankers from the central banking sector insist on the need of coordinating
macroeconomic policies between member states, when the condition “experience in the academic
sector” is absent. However, this seems not to be the case for those belonging to the category
“civil servant”. Central bankers who advocate the need for these reforms argue that a political
and a banking union would ensure the common implementation of rules in the eurozone, and
that these common rules will help to prevent bank crises, and facilitate fiscal transfers between
member countries. These reforms aim then to complete the EMU, and allow for centralized
application of EU-wide rules in the euro area.
Finally, estimation result in column (6) confirms that central bankers from the academic and
the banking sectors are less likely to call for the launch of the LTRO or the government bond
purchases19, while it seems to be the opposite for central bankers holding a PhD, with respect
to those having a MSc.
Hence, the results show that an additional experience in the academic sector has a significant
impact on central bankers’ reform proposals, in particular for the “consolidation measures” and
the “Federally oriented reforms”.
18This is not the case for those having an experience in both the academic and the public sectors, as shown by
the negative and non significant coefficient attached to the category “Acad.*civil”.
19This is not a surprising result given that all the central bankers who had an experience in the banking sector
also had an experience in the academic sector.
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V.2 Years in office
When considering the years in office spent in each professional position in the right-hand side
variables (see Table 3 below), we obtain similar findings as in the previous regressions, although
with a lesser significance for “consolidation measures” and “unconventional monetary easing”.
This result seems intuitive as the distinction between European central bankers is more blurry
and hard to capture, when we consider in detail the time they spent in each professional cate-
gory. Nevertheless, the same conclusions can still be drawn: European central bankers’ reform
proposals are influenced by their educational and professional background.
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Table 3: Economic reforms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant
-0.11 0.11* -0.03 -0.21** -0.09 0.49
(0.25) (0.06) (0.37) (0.01) (0.49) (0.9)
Occupational Background
Banker
-0.007 0.01* 0.007 -0.004 0.006 -0.49
(0.54) (0.09) (0.13) (0.54) (0.55) (0.9)
Civil servant
-0.001 -0.009 -0.001 0.003 -0.003 0.31
(0.7) (0.59) (0.9) (0.1) (0.4) (0.94)
Central Bank
-0.006 -0.005 -0.006 0.004** -0.002 0.2
(0.76) (0.66) (0.56) (0.01) (0.21) (0.6)
Academic
-0.001 -0.005*** -0.001* 0.003* -0.003 -0.16
(0.62) (0.005) (0.09) (0.08) (0.22) (0.9)
Education
Ph.D
0.02 -0.03 0.02 0.07* 0.01 0.08
(0.67) (0.3) (0.35) (0.08) (0.8) (0.9)
MSc Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Political Appointment
Left wing
0.05* 0.001 0.03*** -0.03 0.06* -0.24
(0.09) (0.95) (0.003) (0.24) (0.06) (0.9)
Right wing Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group Reference group
Control variables
GDP growth
0.005 0.002 0.002* -0.002 0.004 -0.19**
(0.14) (0.9) (0.05) (0.41) (0.15) (0.03)
Unemployment
0.01 -0.007 0.001 -0.006 0.006 -0.36
(0.37) (0.33) (0.76) (0.37) (0.48) (0.9)
Debt
0.007 -0.002 0.002 0.001** 0.001 0.09
(0.32) (0.61) (0.35) (0.04) (0.13) (0.88)
Inflation
-0.002 -0.003 -0.004 0.006 0.005 0.82
(0.74) (0.48) (0.11) (0.24) (0.48) (0.87)
Number of observations 136 102 102 85 68 34
(1): Banking and Finance industry reforms. (2): Basel 3 implementation. (3): Consolidation measures. (4): Federally oriented reforms. (5): Market Liberalizing reforms.
(6): Unconventional monetary easing.
*significant at 10%, **significant at 5%, ***significant at 1%, p-value in parentheses.
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VI Conclusion
In this paper, we extract the economic reforms European central bankers proposed since the
start of the euro debt crisis, using the methodology of cognitive mapping. In a next step, we
check whether these reform proposals depend on their respective educational and occupational
background. We find that the differences between the reforms proposed by the central bankers
occur because of their different professional experiences. As an illustration, central bankers from
the public sector focus on measures to correct for countries’ imbalances. The political affiliation
of the governments that have appointed central bankers plays also a key role, i.e., those appointed
by left wing governments support structural and financial reforms. Overall, our analysis confirms
that the indoctrination process European central bankers experienced is crucial for the type of
economic reforms they would like to see implemented.
The policy implication of this study is that in the context of the euro debt crisis, political leaders
might appoint central bankers with a specific background, to promote the adoption of measures
that they wish to implement, not only inside the Governing council of the ECB, but also towards
the general public, via the media channel and public speeches.
However, although some results contradict this proposition (like e.g., that central bankers ap-
pointed by left-wing governments propose consolidation measures and market liberalizing re-
forms, which are traditionally right-wing policies) , Jeroˆme and Jeroˆme-Speziari (2010) provide
arguments that might explain them. They suggest that until an economic recovery happens,
there will be a “rally around the market”, and the discrepancies in terms of economic ideologies
between policy-makers with different political leanings may diminish20.
Therefore, and as an obvious extension, the focus of the analysis might be broadened to the
speeches of political leaders, to check whether they are promoting the same types of economic
reforms than the central bankers of their respective countries. This might be a good proxy to
assess the degree of (in)dependence of the European Central Bankers.
20“...the crisis is rallying neo-Keynesians, neo-Classic economists, monetarists and Smithian liberals around
the idea of a protector State in order to preserve the free market.” Jeroˆme and Jeroˆme-Speziari (2010), (p. 113).
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Appendix
Appendix A
Table 4: Number of speeches analyzed for each central banker and their respective tenure in the
Governing Council
Central Banker Number of speeches analyzed* 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Axel Weber 18 1 1 0 0 0
Carlos Costa 5 0 1 1 1 1
Christian Noyer 27 1 1 1 1 1
Erkki Liikanen 16 1 1 1 1 1
Ewald Nowotny 9 1 1 1 1 1
George Provopoulos 7 1 1 1 1 1
Guy Quaden 5 1 1 0 0 0
Ignazio Visco 6 0 0 0 1 1
Jens Weidmann 19 0 0 1 1 1
Josef Bonnici 4 0 0 1 1 1
Klaas Knot 5 0 0 1 1 1
Luc Coene 2 0 0 1 1 1
Mario Draghi 10 1 1 1 0 0
Miguel Ordonez 13 1 1 1 1 0
Nout Wellkink 11 1 1 1 0 0
Patrick Honohan 34 1 1 1 1 1
Yves Mersch 14 1 1 1 1 0
*All central bankers’ public speeches referenced in the BIS database were analyzed, except news-
paper interviews.
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Appendix B
Patrick Honohan: Two-way interdependence between the banking system and the
State.
Address by Mr Patrick Honohan, Governor of the Central Bank & Financial Services Authority
of Ireland, to the Small Firms Association, Dublin, 11 May 2010.
“...The recapitalization of the banks, which we announced at the end of March, is key to
dispelling the cloud of ill defined banking losses that has been hanging over the public finances
for many months...The experience has shown how crucial it is to stay on a disciplined course
to correction of the public finances right across the euro area. This is essential if the financial
markets are to work more effectively and in particular resume their key function of helping to
finance the recovery including through lending to small firms...
The recapitalization and restructuring of the banks will be accomplished by end year. They
will be stable and secure, capable of resuming their role in providing financial services to the
economy...Staying on course to reduce this underlying deficit is absolutely crucial to ensuring
that confidence in the public finances can be maintained and strengthened...”
Figure 4: Honohan’s cognitive map deducted from an excerpt of his speech “Two-way interde-
pendence between the banking system and the State”
Recapitalization 
of the banks 
Correction of 
public finances 
Financial services to 
the economy 
Banking losses 
Efficiency of 
financial markets 
Confidence in public 
finance 
+ 
+ 
+ 
- 
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Appendix C
Table 5: Reform proposals
Category Reforms
Reforms of the banking and finance industry
Advocacy for financial reforms
Increase of transparency
Increase of macroprudential instruments
Asset restriction
Separation of Bank activities
Restructuring of Banks
Resolution regime
Basel 3 implementation
Advocacy for Basel 3
Reduction of the leverage ratio
Introduction of the countercyclical capital buffer
Increase of liquidity standards
Increase of capital requirements
Additional capital buffer
Consolidation measures
Advocacy for consolidation
Reduction of government expenditures
Correction of public imbalances
Restructuring of public debt
Enforcement of the Stability and Growth Pact
Budget adjustment program
Federally oriented reforms
Banking union
Common supervision
Political Union
Coordination of macroeconomic policies
Introduction of the Eurobonds
Liberalization market reforms
Structural reforms
Privatization measures
Labor market reforms
Remove of competition barriers
Unconventional monetary easing
Support of government bond purchases
Support for LTRO
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Appendix D
Table 6: Years in office (until July 2013)
Years in office
Central Banker Banking sector Public sector Central Banking sector Academia sector
Carlos Da Costa Silva 6 14 7 27
Christian Noyer 38
Erkkii Liikanen 42
Ewald Nowotny 1 36
George Provopoulos 15 7 3 28
Guy Quaden 1 33
Ignazio Visco 42
Jens Weidmann 11 3
Josef Bonnici 18 16
Klaas Knot 2 14 6
Luc Coene 11 17
Mario Draghi 3 10 16
Axel Weber 2 15
Miguel Fernandez 32
Nout Wellink 12 15
Patrick Honohan 4 7 10
Yves Mersch 40
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